Introduction
The distortionary effects of state and local taxes have commonly been measured by estimates of the behavioral response of mobile factors of production and consumers to various tax structure parameters. Perhaps the best example of such applications is the extensive literature on business location determinants which has explored how tax policy has affected the physical location of real business activity, using empirical measures like job creation, income growth and business starts. A general finding of this research is that taxes on mobile agents and factors of production cause flight to lower-tax jurisdictions, though the effects tend to be modest.
1 This physical movement of economic activity across jurisdictional lines has important implications for the tax base and revenue yield, and thus state tax policy toward business.
The business location literature has captured the physical mobility of factors and agents in response to taxation. But taxes may affect behavior in other ways, in particular, the organizational form of the business enterprise. The federal government and the states unevenly tax different types of business entities, and these differences may affect the decision regarding the choice of form. The web of hundreds of business affiliates, including corporations, partnerships, limited partnerships, and limited liability corporations (LLCs) that were linked to Enron when it collapsed in 2001, is at least in part attributable to tax planning opportunities and tax planning responses. The choice of organizational form may in turn affect real economic activity and revenue collections, with impacts that could be large or small. But the transmission mechanism for these effects is the form of the economic activity, rather than the initial physical mobility response of a factor of production or an economic agent to taxation.
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The impact of taxes on business organizational form is important for a number of reasons. First are the implications for the location of real economic activity, as noted above, and the related excess burdens of state income tax systems. 3 Second are the potentially large costs associated with tax administration, tax compliance and tax planning. Third are the revenue consequences for the states. While state corporate tax revenues rebounded prior to the slowdown in economic activity in 2008, they have been in long-term decline as a share of state taxes. Whether these declines represent lower total tax collections from business activity, or are perhaps just a shift of taxes from the corporate to the individual income tax ledger, is a critical issue for states' budgets and planning efforts. Finally, the states' response to tax planning around business organizational form-for example, the introduction of combined reporting-may have deleterious effects on economic development by signaling a negative business climate.
The states seem to want it both ways. On the one hand they enable planning opportunities through the introduction of pass-thru business forms, while on the other hand they try to limit the responses to such opportunities through policies like combined reporting and throwback rules.
To our knowledge, there are no empirical inquiries on the way in which state income tax policies have affected state-level organizational form. Several papers have, 2 A similar situation arises with the cross-border shopping phenomenon. The literature shows that sales tax rate differentials induce consumers to physically cross jurisdictional boundaries to make retail purchases.
(See, for example, Chervin, Edmiston and Murray, 2000.) Border shopping also can take place absent the physical movement of a final consumer to a retailer in another taxing jurisdiction. Consumer "mobility" is facilitated by longstanding mail order opportunities and more recently the Internet which provides remote access to retailers across the globe. 3 See, for example, Goolsbee (1998) for a discussion of the deadweight losses that arise from the differential taxation of corporate versus non-corporate businesses.
however, examined how the federal income tax system influences organizational form and business behavior (see below). Goolsbee's (2004) The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The first section below provides a discussion of the way that taxes may affect tax planning and organizational form to frame the empirical inquiry. The next section develops the logic that underlies the empirics. We then turn to our empirical strategy and findings. The final section offers a conclusion and suggestions for further research. Nontax factors are of considerable importance, since there must be some benefit to the formation of a C corporation to offset the more burdensome taxation that it confronts. Both Mackie-Mason and Gordon (1997) and Ayers, Cloyd and Robinson (1996) find that nontax factors are more important than tax factors in affecting form and business decision making.
Taxes and Organizational Form
There are numerous potential nontax benefits associated with the corporate form.
Limited liability is an important benefit that can be realized by forming a regular corporation at the federal or state level, or a limited liability pass-thru partnership or corporation at the state level; sole proprietorships and general partnerships do not benefit from limited liability. The ability to issue common stock and access national and international capital and credit markets is a distinct advantage for corporations. Investing in the stock of a corporation is simple and easily understood by potential investors, whereas the rights and obligations of an equity interest in an LLC will vary from entity to entity depending on the individualized LLC agreement. Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1994) consider the differential ability of different business forms to bear risk and find advantages to regular corporations in some instances, and advantages to pass-thru entities in other instances. Finally, Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989) amend the Harberger tax incidence model to accommodate the empirical reality that both corporate and noncorporate businesses operate in the same product markets. While large corporations may benefit from scale economies, Gravelle and Kotlikoff argue that small business enterprises may benefit from entrepreneurial advantages that allow them to compete and coexist in the same market.
New Business Formations Versus Multi-entity Firms
The literature has generally examined the formation of new business entities that would be domiciled in a single taxing jurisdiction and has ignored potential ownership linkages between businesses of similar or different organizational form both within and across jurisdictions. The choice of organizational form for an independent startup would presumably depend on the tax and nontax considerations discussed above. Tax planning in this instance is minimized in importance and scope because there is a single choice of state of location and type of business form. As for nontax factors, a need to access public capital markets (debt or equity) might suggest organizing as a C corporation. But a business contemplating joining with an investment partner can use many business forms, including the LLC. A firm that is expected to have early losses could either form a corporation to keep the losses on the books at the entity level to apply against future income or organize as a pass-thru such as an LLC and immediately pass early losses out to the members.
The situation may differ markedly for a new business entity that will be linked by common ownership to other firms. Federal taxation of the new entity is often dictated by the taxation of the existing business. For example, income earned by entities formed under a corporate umbrella will be ultimately taxed on the parent's corporate return, either through consolidation of corporate entities, or, for pass-thru entities such as LLCs, passed through to the corporate owner. Questions that might be critical to the stand-alone entity, such as federal individual rates versus corporate rates and the tax rate on dividends, will often be irrelevant to this type of new entity. However, the entity choice might be critical for state tax planning efforts depending on state tax parameters.
In practice, state tax planning may extend beyond income taxes. A very unique form of in-state tax planning that elicited a response from Congress has been referred to as SUTA (State Unemployment Tax Act) Dumping (Crumbley and Gamin, 2006) . Under state unemployment insurance systems, employers pay an experience-rated tax that depends on past usage of the unemployment insurance system and the payout of benefits.
Firms with a high prevalence of terminations and layoffs will thus confront relatively high unemployment insurance tax rates. New firm entrants to an industry will, depending on the state, confront an average rate for that sector; rates will fall over time for such firms if they do not rely heavily on the system. So in practice different firms both within and across industries will confront different unemployment insurance tax rates giving rise to tax planning incentives. While the amount of revenue is small compared to major state taxes, the incentive to game the tax system still exists. Another popular planning strategy using PICs is to "park" income and expenses in tax-advantaged states using entities that are not pass-through (e.g. corporations). In this planning model, a business transfers intangible assets such as trademarks and trade names to a Delaware PIC. Operational entities in other states make royalty payments to the Delaware PIC for the right to use the intangible assets. The payments are deductible to the operating entities, but non-taxable to the Delaware PIC. The transaction creates deductible expenses and non-taxed income, but its success is dependent on the ability to park both the income and the expense in the state with the most favorable income tax treatment. The ability to park income in low-tax or no-tax states should encourage corporate formations in those states versus corporate formations in high tax jurisdictions.
State Tax Planning Across Borders and Entity Choice Decisions
The states have a number of options that can be used to limit the effectiveness of strategies intended to create nowhere income or to shift income from high-to low-tax states. Required combined reporting is the most comprehensive and effective tool against these potentially abusive strategies because the policy rules effectively ignore the presence of separate legal entities. Entities engaged in a unitary business are combined as one, and the combined income is apportioned to the various states. With combined reporting, for example, the impact of the PIC collapses and has the same practical effect of a tiny Delaware office with few employees and/or little property. Add-back provisions and throw-back rules are piecemeal remedies. Add-back rules disallow deductibility of a targeted list of payments such as royalties paid to related parties; throw-back rules allow income that is not taxed in any other state to be "thrown back" to the state of business residence and taxed there. The presence or absence of these rules might affect both the existence and the form of an organization.
Differences in apportionment methods across states and business forms create incentives to use one entity versus an alternative. If a business operates in more than one state, the income of the entity is apportioned to each state based on an apportionment formula, historically using a three-factor equally-weighted formula of property, payroll, and sales. However, some states, such as Kentucky, use different apportionment formulas for LLCs versus corporations. Kentucky apportions LLC income using a single factor sales formula, but apportions corporate income using a three factor formula.
Therefore, transferring capital and labor intensive manufacturing operations into Kentucky, for example, using an LLC (where those factors are ignored) has the effect of diminishing income apportioned to the state.
Empirical Framework
Our starting point for the empirical analysis is estimation of models taking the form:
where the dependent variable CSHARE is defined as the corporate share of total business federal tax returns (alternatively business registrations) for state i in time period t. This model assumes that total business activity in a state could be supported by any mix of businesses with different organizational forms. CIT represents a vector of state corporate tax structure parameters while PASS is a vector that includes characteristics of taxes that fall on entrepreneurs and limited liability business entities. OTH are other characteristics of the states, including a set of sociodemographic variables, fiscal factors and a sectoral control.
We also estimate models in level form using analogous explanatory variables:
PARTNERSHIP i,t = θ 0 + CIT`θ 1 + PASS`θ 2 + OTH`θ 3 + ε i,t A second distinction between the IRS and registration data is the former uses the address on the tax return to assign the location. For a company with operations in many states, the IRS data will assign the entire business's activity to the filing state or the state where the business is headquartered. As a result, the IRS data will generally reveal the location of both active businesses and corporate headquarters. The business registration data tracks the type of entity filing to do business in any state for the year. A single legal entity could file to do business in many states, and the data will show the year an existing entity expands into a new state as well as registrations of new businesses. Furthermore, a business could register to do business in a state but not possess sufficient nexus to file a return due to the protections of PL 86-272. Accordingly, for variables such as throwback rules, and combined reporting, the registration data should show weaker impacts since not all businesses registering will file a state tax return. We presume that the business does have nexus in the state used for its filing address through physical presence.
To capture annual changes in business entity choices for the IRS data, we calculated the change in the number of entities filing as corporations and partnerships each year. The amount will include both births and deaths of each entity type and therefore does not produce an amount that represents new IRS filings each year.
Accordingly, this figure is still not directly comparable to the registration data which capture all new filings, but will not include businesses which dropped out of the states authorized business listings. The correlations between the two measures reveal that these differences are real.
Data and Empirical Findings

Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 1 
Empirical Results
The models used in this analysis will take the overall trend of movement towards pass through entities as a given, since many of the key changes apply equally to all states, such as the check the box rules for LLCs which apply to federal returns. Time trend variables will capture these overall influences on business formation. In this study, the variables of interest are state-level variables that show variation across both time and space. The goal is to identify the way state tax structure influences variation in the mix of corporate and noncorporate business entities between the states.
We test our baseline model with CSHARE as the dependent variable, and we present the results in Table 2 . Note first that this model, along with those discussed below, include all states, regardless of whether the state has a personal or corporate income tax. This is the appropriate set of states since those without an income still represent viable locations for doing business. Eliminating states without a corporate income tax, for example, would eliminate a handful of states that might represent tax haven states or simply states with a good tax climate. We have estimated a model of this form and find weaker results than those presented below. This is to be expected since we have narrowed the possible effects of state tax policy to only those states with a corporate income tax.
Recall that the IRS corporate share includes both S and C corporations as well as single member LLCs with corporate owners and those LLCs electing to be taxed as a corporation at the federal level. Entities filing as partnerships could be general or limited partnerships, or one of the limited liability entities such as LLCs or LLPs. The IRS data do not include other potential business forms such as sole proprietorships or business activities conducted within non-profit entities.
As shown in Table 2 , an increase in Corp_rate reduces the corporate share of total returns filed, and therefore increases the percentage of firms choosing to file as a partnership, as expected. Also consistent with predictions, the coefficient on Nonbusinc, which captures UDIPTA's treatment of non-business income, was negative and highly significant. The existence of a throwback rule (Throwback) decreased the corporate share of business returns, as expected. This finding has been robust across a wide array of model specifications.
The coefficient for the weight of the sales apportionment factor (Salesappor) is negative, contrary to expectations, indicating that increasing the weight on sales in the formula reduced corporate formations and increased the share of those organizing as partnerships. The predicted effect of increasing the sales weight is to attract or retain net exporting in-state businesses, typically capital and labor intensive operations, would favor manufacturing firms. Indeed, the share of manufacturing in the state (Mfg_Share)
is positively associated with a higher corporate share. The manufacturing variable may be capturing some of the influence of the apportionment factor. But the negative coefficient on Salesappor has been robust across a wide variety of different model specifications. One possible explanation is that states with weak growth in corporate entities are the states which have adopted sales-weighted apportionment. To test this conjecture, we re-specified the apportionment factor as a dummy variable taking a value of 0 if the sales apportionment weight was less than 0.5 and 1 if the apportionment weight was greater than 0.5. In this instance, the coefficient of Salesappor was positive but insignificant. Salesappor remains negative and statistically significant even when we drop states without a corporate income tax from the database.
Combined reporting requirements, which are often criticized by the business community, has an insignificant effect on corporate share. This finding may reflect the fact that not all businesses lose under such a reporting relationship. Some firms may be encouraged to locate in a state with combined reporting (e.g., those businesses wishing to consolidate loss entities with profitable entities, or to accomplish some transfer pricing tax planning schemes), while some other firms (e.g. those with high profit entities located in low tax states other than the combined reporting state) might be discouraged, together yielding no net effect on corporate formation.
Similarly, we find that requiring add-backs of certain expenses paid to related parties has no impact on corporation formation. Add-back provisions and combined reporting represent a tax policy continuum, with combined reporting being the most comprehensive means of combating tax planning. We experimented with alternative formulations of the combined reporting and add-back variables, including a variable that accounted for the absence of either policy, the presence of either policy and the presence of both policies. In general these alternative specifications did not produce statistically significant results.
Neither of the variables related to the taxation of LLCs impacted the share of businesses in the corporate form. The percentage of workers with a college degree (BAdeg) was positive and marginally significant, suggesting that corporations establish roots in states with a well-educated workforce.
The latter two columns of Table 2 reflect regression results for total corporate and partnership returns. As one would expect, the results are largely similar to the corporate share specification, although nonbusiness income, education, and manufacturing do not have a significant effect on total corporate and partnership returns filed. Nonbusiness income has a negative sign and approaches conventional significance levels for the count of corporations, which suggests that this is the source of the negative effect on the corporate share discussed above. The Mfg_Share coefficient is positive and has a tstatistic of 1.45, suggesting that corporate activity is the source of the positive coefficient on the corporate share of businesses.
Burden is positive and statistically significant for both entity types, while the same variable has no effect on the corporate share. One interpretation, given the way our models are specified, is that a higher overall tax burden is offset by the spending side of the budget, including advantages such as better infrastructure and better quality government services, including elementary and secondary education.
Throwback rules have a negative effect on the number of corporate returns filed, but have no positive effect on the number of partnership returns filed. The transmission mechanism for the negative effect of throwback rules on the corporate share is the number of corporate entities. Finally, the imposition of a corporate tax rate on LLCs is associated with a decrease in partnership tax returns. Taxing partnerships at the potentially higher corporate tax rate increases the incentive to form as a corporation and reduces tax planning opportunities that seek to shift income to entities that enjoy a lower tax rate.
We excluded any measure of the unemployment insurance tax burden from the baseline model because the data were unavailable for the final year of the study period.
We did test the effect of unemployment insurance tax policies for the remaining years by calculating a variable representing unemployment benefits paid as a share of payroll, ui_benperpay, and adding it to the baseline model for CSHARE. Ui_benperpay was negative and highly significant in this model, indicating that high unemployment benefits discourage corporate formations. But the same variable failed to show significance in the levels models. These results offer little or no support for the SUTA dumping argument.
Sensitivity Tests
The IRS data did not permit us to isolate the number of new business returns filed each year. The data will include repeat filers, plus new entities filing initial returns, but omits those businesses who failed to file that year because of dissolution or other reasons such as insufficient business activity. However, we did calculate the change in the number of corporate and partnership returns filed each year to get some idea of the annual flow for the two entity types, ∆CORP and ∆PART. We specify these models in analogous fashion to those presented above.
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The regression results using ∆CORP as the dependent variable are presented in Table 3 . As in previous models, the top bracket corporate tax rate (Corp_rate) has a significant and negative effect on the change in corporate returns filed. IRC_Conform also has a negative and significant effect. This is consistent with predictions that during the sample period, with two major tax cuts for business activity, departure from the Internal Revenue Code was more likely to result in higher tax burdens and reduce 11 An alternative strategy would be to estimate changes-changes models. We do not pursue this path because of the large number of dummy variables and the modest variation in these factors over time.
corporate filings. The existence of a throwback rule was also negative, indicating that the change in corporate returns filed was smaller when this rule is imposed. The imposition of an LLC withholding tax increased the change in corporate returns filed. Presumably, the withholding tax decreased tax planning opportunities for LLCs, increasing the relative desirability of the corporate form. Population was positive and significant, as expected.
The results of the regression with ∆PART are also presented in Table 5 .
Surprisingly, neither the corporate rate nor the individual rate is significant in this model.
In fact, statistical significance was found only with IRC_Conform and Throwback, with coefficients of both variables negative, similar to the results using ∆CORP. Notably, throwback rules require that if income is not apportioned to any state, they will be "thrown back" to the home state and taxed there. The implication is throwback rules discourage new business filings for both partnerships (and therefore LLCs) as well as corporations. It is not possible to determine whether this has a dampening effect on business activity in general, or just the location of the business headquarters in a throwback state. Similarly, departure from the IRC during the sample period could indicate a generally unfriendly business environment, although further investigation of the manner with which the states departed from the IRC would be needed to confirm this conclusion.
Conclusion
The choice of business entity is determined by both state and federal factors. The trend towards pass through entities versus corporations is perhaps attributable to both federal check the box rules and state level developments that provide businesses the limited liability, organizational flexibility, and pass through income tax treatment in the limited liability forms. However, the large variation in corporation versus partnership filings across the states, even when controlling for scale (i.e. population) suggests that state tax policy may have an important effect on organizational form and nexus decisions. Mobility in response to tax policy parameters has generally been viewed as the movement of mobile factors of production and consumers who seek low-tax jurisdictions to produce or make purchases. The empirical work presented here provides strong evidence that tax policy can influence mobility in an extended fashion by affecting the choice of business organizational form. More empirical work is needed to translate these impacts on organizational form into real effects on economic activity and state tax revenue. 
